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1. Introduction
The “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives” (DAI) 
project is a major study undertaken for the 
World Bank to track trends in taxation of, or 
support to, the agriculture sector across coun-
tries and regions over the past few decades. It 
thus updates earlier work by Krueger et.al. 
(1988), who had reported widespread and heavy 
taxation of agriculture in developing countries. 
The DAI project shows that, in the intervening 
period, taxation of agriculture has given way to 
subsidy in much of Asia and Latin America, 
whilst in Africa average levels of agricultural 
taxation fell during the structural adjustment 
period. 
In much the same way as Bates (1981) sought 
to explain prevailing high taxation of African 
agriculture in terms of domestic political 
economy factors, attention is now switching to 
understanding the political economy determi-
nants of more recent taxation patterns (see, for 
example, Bates and Block 2009). This is a very 
worthwhile endeavour, as is the entire DAI 
project. However, before political economy 
theorising proceeds too far, this paper provides 
a salutary check on some of the underlying 
numbers that have been presented for 
explanation.
This paper discusses the estimation methods 
used in Anderson and Masters (2009) to calcu-
late nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) for cotton 
and other traditional export cash crops in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and offers alternative esti-
mates for cotton for a sub-set of countries, on 
the basis of a standardised approach, alternative 
data sources and correcting some basic but 
important errors concerning processing ratios.
Traditional export cash crops are interesting 
for two reasons. Firstly, according to Anderson 
and Masters (2009, p21) agricultural NRAs in 
Africa are now (still) “most negative for tropical 
cash crops such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, and 
tobacco.” Secondly, from a political economy 
perspective, traditional export cash crops are 
often associated with particular production 
regions and ethnic groups. Thus, taxation of 
these crops may provide insights into how 
decision-makers behave towards members of 
their and other ethnic groups (Bates and Block 
2009, Kasara 2007): what do they have to offer 
to whom in order to obtain and retain power?
Sixteen African country studies were under-
taken for the DAI project, in addition to which 
one paper by John Baffes calculates NRA esti-
mates for eight cotton sectors of West and 
Central Africa (WCA), five of which are countries 
that do not otherwise feature in the DAI data-
base. This paper draws on the country data 
spreadsheets and background papers that are 
downloadable from the project website: http://
go.worldbank.org/5XY7A7LH40. It focuses 
exclusively on direct agricultural distortions and 
abstracts from indirect agricultural assistance/
taxation via non-agricultural distortions, except 
through distortions to the exchange rate. 
Our calculations reaffirm the basic finding of 
Anderson and Masters (2009) that the extent of 
agricultural taxation has fallen significantly since 
structural adjustment. However, our estimates 
suggest much lower levels of taxation than 
those displayed in Anderson and Masters (2009) 
both pre-reform in some countries and post-
reform in most of them. As a result, we both 1) 
argue that the detailed pattern of NRAs for 
export cash crops that political economy anal-
ysis needs to explain is rather different from that 
currently presented by the DAI project and 2) 
question the general assertion that such crops 
are taxed more heavily than average in Africa.
The DAI project is hugely ambitious both in 
its coverage of countries and crops and in the 
time period for which it seeks to generate esti-
mates. The construction of reliable NRA esti-
mates for a period of several decades requires 
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not just detailed data, but also in depth knowl-
edge of the relevant sectors over that period. 
In the African context, where data is often 
missing or of poor quality, generating reliable 
estimates requires a critical assessment of avail-
able data and/or the estimation of a number of 
parameters, for which the information is not 
readily available in the literature. This paper 
suggests that more work is required to validate 
NRA estimates for traditional export cash crops 
in Africa before detailed work is undertaken to 
explain variations in observed taxation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. In section two, we outline the objective 
of the NRA estimates. In section three, we illus-
trate what NRA attempt to capture – or not – 
looking at the cotton sector. In section four, we 
describe how NRA estimates proceed in practice 
and contrast the diff erent estimation approaches 
and underlying principles. In sections fi ve and 
six, we outline issues with current cotton NRA 
estimation in the DAI project and discuss alter-
native estimates for a sub-set of countries. In 
section seven, we investigate whether the issues 
identifi ed with NRA estimates for cotton also 
apply to other cash-crops. Section eight 
concludes on the implications of this critical 
review of NRAs for African cash-crops.
2. Objective of the NRA estimates
The purpose of the DAI project is to estimate 
the extent to which governments have distorted 
incentives for farmers to produce diff erent agri-
cultural products. Thus: 
“The nominal rate of assistance is 
defined as the percentage by which 
government policies have raised gross 
returns to farmers above what they would 
have been without the government’s 
intervention” (Anderson and Masters eds 
2009, p11; emphasis added).
“The focus is on those border and 
domestic measures that arise exclusively 
from government actions, that, as such, 
may be altered by a political decision, and 
that have an immediate eff ect on consumer 
choices, producer resource allocations, 
and net farm incomes” (Anderson and 
Masters eds 2009, p507)
State intervention can impact a farmer’s gross 
returns through three broad channels: (i) direct 
taxes and subsidies at various levels, e.g. export 
or import tax/subsidy on the processed product 
or local tax/subsidy on the primary product; (ii) 
indirect taxes or subsidies resulting from admin-
istrative pricing and/or excessive post-harvest 
margins, where these are due to the ineffi  ciency 
of state enterprises and (iii) exchange rate distor-
tions. NRAs aim to capture all three, when 
relevant.
3. The cotton story
In the case of cotton, the three state intervention 
channels listed above have all mattered histori-
cally. All African producing countries have, at 
some point in time since the 1960s, administra-
tively fi xed prices and intervened directly in 
ginning, that is, the transformation of seed 
cotton into cotton lint (Delpeuch and Leblois, 
2011). In addition, in a number of countries, 
particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), 
exchange rates have been signifi cantly distorted.
In ex-French WCA colonies, indirect distor-
tions still affect markets as single-channel 
marketing systems have at most been margin-
ally/gradually reformed: some national monop-
olies remain (either state-controlled or 
privatised), some have been turned into conces-
sion systems (regional monopolies), and in those 
sectors where multiple players have been 
allowed, heavy regulation still prevents direct 
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competition for seed cotton purchase or pricing 
(Delpeuch and Leblois, 2011). 
Elsewhere, in contrast, direct state control 
was largely eliminated by the mid-1990s. 
Reforms have however led to wide variation in 
industry structures (Tschirley et al., 2009). 
Distinctive features of cotton sectors in Africa 
- chiefly the interlocking of input and output 
markets resulting from the need for costly inputs 
and the lack of both contract enforcement insti-
tutions and rural credit access - mean that the 
performance of the sector is affected by a 
competition-coordination trade-off (Poulton et 
al., 2004; Tschirley et al., 2009). This trade-off 
results mainly from the fact that the greater 
competition is, the more difficult it becomes to 
enforce input-credit contracts and thus the 
more the sustainability of input-credit schemes 
is likely to be challenged. 
The different sector structures observed post-
liberalisation represent different responses to 
this trade-off, mixed with elements of historical 
path dependence. Thus, even post-reform, it 
can be state policy or public/private regulatory 
bodies that maintain monopolistic or oligopo-
listic sector structures, with both direct and 
indirect consequences for seed cotton pricing 
(e.g., lack of competition in purchase price for 
primary products from farmers and X-inefficiency 
in marketing margins respectively). 
Two modest but worthwhile reflections on 
NRAs flow from this brief outline of the cotton 
case. Firstly, Anderson and Masters (2008 p3) 
emphasise that “getting markets right requires 
a focus not only on incentives but also on institu-
tions and infrastructure” and the cotton case 
neatly illustrates this. Indeed, both Poulton et 
al. (2004) and Tschirley et al. (2009) find that 
concentrated and/or monopoly cotton systems 
generally outperform competitive ones in terms 
of farmer returns, as the higher yields that can 
be achieved when input credit and extension 
advice are readily available commonly outweigh 
the loss in pricing performance that comes from 
reduced competition in a sector. 
Secondly, the distinction between state inter-
vention that impacts farmer returns through 
depressed seed cotton pricing and private 
monopoly that has the same effect is not always 
clear cut. In Mozambique, for example, ginners 
operate in a local monopsony system by law. In 
addition, state representatives are party to the 
annual negotiations regarding seed cotton price 
setting. Poulton et.al. (2004) and Tschirley et.al. 
(2009) both find farmer returns in Mozambique 
to be the lowest amongst their sampled coun-
tries and attribute this poor performance to the 
weak regulation of the chosen concession 
model. Is this a case of private monopoly power 
depressing farmer returns or a policy choice that 
could be “altered by a political decision”? We 
return to this issue below. 
4. Operationalisation of NRAs in the 
DAI project
General approach
The key idea behind NRAs is to compare the 
actual price of a good, which reflects the impact 
of policy “distortions”, with an estimated “undis-
torted” price for the same product. NRAs can 
thus be calculated at different levels of the 
supply chain and may vary along the chain 
depending on how and where policy “distor-
tions” exert their influence. Ultimately, however, 
the primary interest of both this paper and the 
DAI project is to estimate the overall effect of 
policy distortions on farmers. In practice the 
African background papers and data spread-
sheets of the DAI project achieve this in at least 
three different ways, depending on data avail-
ability and the nature of the product in question. 
Each approach has its advantages, but also 
important disadvantages that need to be 
recognised. 
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The conventional place to look for a reference 
price for a product that is “undistorted” by 
domestic (including border) policy measures is 
the international market1. As products traded 
at this level generally embody a degree of 
processing, the central comparison in NRA 
calculations is thus between the so-called 
“undistorted international price – processed 
product” (Pip), derived from the world market, 
and the so-called “wholesale price for the 
processed goods” (Pup) pertaining in the 
domestic market.
The estimation of Pip is not specifi c to any of 
the approaches below, but rather depends on 
data availability. Thus, we discuss it briefl y here. 
We focus on export commodities, as these are 
the main focus of the paper, although in some 
of the specifi c examples discussed below the 
good in question has only irregularly been 
exported. When an f.o.b. export price series, 
denominated in foreign currency terms and 
reflecting the prices actually received by 
exporters, was available to DAI researchers, the 
Pip that they use is this f.o.b. price converted to 
domestic currency using the so-called estimated 
“equilibrium exchange rate which would prevail 
in an undistorted market” (E). When compared 
to the exchange rate actually used by exporters, 
E aims to capture the impact of foreign currency 
restrictions, generally imposed to sustain an 
artificially overvalued exchange rate, on the 
profi tability of domestic producers of tradable 
goods2. When the actual f.o.b. prices received 
were not available, the Pip is estimated on the 
basis of an international reference price (for 
example, the Cotlook A index for cotton lint), 
adjusted as best as possible for both quality 
diff erences and for “international trading costs 
for exports” (i.e. a c.i.f. to f.o.b. margin), where 
appropriate. As before, the resulting fi gure is 
converted to local currency using E.
We now turn to the three approaches used 
in practice to estimate the overall eff ect of policy 
distortions on farmers. These diff er in how Pup 
is derived and how this is linked to the price 
received by farmers.
Approach 1: Work backwards from the 
actual price for the processed good
The first approach is to calculate the rate of 
distortion at the processed-good level and then 
to adjust for additional sources of distortion as 
one moves backward along the supply chain to 
farm-level. This requires the availability of a price 
series that directly captures the price that 
processors could obtain for their products in 
local currency terms, i.e. Pup. Logically, such series 
are more likely to be available for import-
competing products, or for products for which 
there is a strong local market as well as export 
opportunities3, than for products that are largely 
or exclusively exported. However, some exam-
ples are found amongst traditional export 
commodities in the African studies in the DAI 
database. For example, in cotton this could be 
the price at which ginners sell their lint to a local 
spinning industry.
The NRA for the processed good (NRAp) is 
then calculated as follows:
NRAp = (1 + sp) * Pup/Pip – 1
Where sp = “taxes or subsidies on the processed 
good (sp <0 if a tax)”.
Anderson et.al. (2008) argue that this already 
captures the impact of what are, from a global 
perspective, the main distortions ultimately 
aff ecting farmgate prices, i.e. border measures 
(tariff s, export taxes) and exchange rate distor-
tions. However, some work is still required to 
translate this into an NRA at farm level.
To obtain farm-level distortions, several addi-
tional factors are considered:
 • Firstly, analysts have to assess the extent to 
which distortions at processing level are 
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passed back to farmers through pricing 
processes within the supply chain. In the DAI 
database this is captured by two ‘transmission 
factors’, one (θ) capturing transmission of 
distortions from processed product level to 
primary product level and another (θf) 
capturing transmission from primary product 
level to farm-gate level; 
 • Secondly, any local-level taxes (sf, where sf <0 
if a tax) and consumer subsidies (cc) on the 
primary good have to be taken into account. 
Local-level taxes have increased in Africa as 
decentralised local government authorities 
have sought to broaden their revenue base. 
By contrast, we are not aware of any consumer 
subsidies on primary products in the sectors 
discussed in this paper. Once again, the full 
burden of such taxes (or subsidies) may not 
be passed onto producers by the traders on 
whom they are first levied, so analysts also 
have to consider a coefficient for the “propor-
tion of distortions in primary sector accruing 
to farmers” (λf)
4.  
The NRA at farm-gate level (NRAf) is thus 
calculated as follows:
NRAf = (1+ λf * ((1+ sf) * (1 – cc) -1)) * (1 + θf * 
NRAprimary) - 1
In which NRAprimary = θ * NRAp
Data permitting, this is the preferred approach 
for calculating farm level NRAs within the DAI 
project (Anderson et.al. 2008). It captures the 
effects of direct taxation/subsidization as well 
as exchange rate distortions, whilst the impact 
of private market imperfections is strictly limited 
to the extent to which policy distortions that 
bear on downstream actors in the supply chain 
are passed upstream to farmers. 
On the other hand, for the purposes of this 
paper, it  suffers from two significant 
disadvantages:
 • The first, as already noted, is that suitable 
price series for Pup are often not available for 
traditional export crops in Africa. The majority 
of these products are exported, often in semi-
processed form, with the domestic market 
remaining small. Since liberalisation, many 
have been processed and exported by verti-
cally integrated agribusinesses, such that 
price data immediately after initial processing 
within the country of origin are not known.
 • The second is the issue of transmission coef-
ficients. The basis for choosing these coeffi-
cients is not clear. Anderson and Masters 
(2009, p17) admit that, “To estimate the NRA 
for a typical farmer, authors of the country 
studies estimated or guessed the extent of 
pass-through back to the farmgate” (emphasis 
added). In practice, for the cotton cases, these 
coefficients are often set to 1. However, where 
more precise estimates are used, varying 
across time in some cases, the basis for these 
estimates is not provided5. In addition, pre-
liberalisation, a transmission coefficient 
cannot adequately capture effects of indirect 
taxation/subsidisation due to either admin-
istrative farm-gate pricing6 or excessive post-
harvest margins due to inefficiency of state 
enterprises. The basis for choosing the coef-
ficient for the proportion of distortions in 
primary sector accruing to farmers is similarly 
unclear. 
Approach 2: Estimate Pup based on farmgate 
prices
The second approach, which is carefully 
explained and illustrated by Baffes (2007), starts 
from the producer price for the primary good 
and uses available data on technical parameters 
and costs within the marketing chain to estimate 
Pup, as follows: 
Pup = (Pf*(1 + m1))/GoR * (1 + m2)
where:
Pf = farm-gate selling price for the primary good 
(i.e. producer price)
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m1 = “effi  cient” margin for transportation and 
handling to move primary good from point of 
purchase to processing facility (expressed as 
share of producer price)
GoR = processing conversion factor – in the case 
of cotton, the ginning out-turn ratio
m2 = “effi  cient” margin for processing plus trans-
portation to port and associated port charges 
(expressed as share of “into factory” price of one 
processed unit equivalent of primary product).
Then, as Pup is directly derived from the producer 
price, NRAf = Pup/Pip-1
Within this approach, the level of taxation is 
eff ectively a residual fi gure (Pip – Pup). Under 
diff erent circumstances, this is both a strength 
and a weakness. 
Pre-liberalisation, this approach neatly 
captures the impacts of indirect taxation/subsi-
disation resulting from both administrative 
farm-gate pricing and excessive post-harvest 
margins. As only “effi  cient” margins are incor-
porated into Pup, if margins have in practice 
exceeded these, depressing producer prices in 
the process7, then this will show up in a lowered 
NRA. Additional advantages of the approach 
include the fact that:
 • It eliminates the need to estimate transmis-
sion coeffi  cients or the proportion of distor-
tions in primary sector accruing to farmers;
 • Seed cotton prices and ginning out-turn ratio 
data are readily available;
 • Data on actual amounts of local-level taxes 
paid are not required, as their impact is 
observed indirectly through seed cotton 
pricing.
On the other hand, the disadvantages are 
that:
 • This approach requires the estimation of “effi  -
cient” margins for both processing and trans-
portation functions, stripped of X-ineffi  ciency. 
This requires plenty of secondary data and 
insight into processing operations. Moreover, 
as Appendix 1 shows, even within a given 
country, “effi  cient” margins can vary over time 
with changes in capacity utilisation driven 
by factors (such as rainfall) beyond the control 
of individual companies.
 • Post-liberalisation, in a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic sector, the NRA calculation will 
incorporate both effects of government 
policy and impacts of private market imper-
fections on producer pricing8.
How serious this latter issue is is open to 
debate. If the objective of NRA analysis is to 
compare the impact of the “whole package” of 
state policy on farmers over time, then including 
the impacts of post-liberalisation private 
monopoly alongside pre-liberalisation state 
monopoly is entirely reasonable. We have 
already noted, in the Cotton Story section, that 
state regulatory policy may accept a degree of 
private monopoly or oligopoly and, therefore, 
that the burden imposed on farmers will depend 
at least in part on the eff ectiveness of the regu-
lator in counter-acting the impact of that power 
on pricing. We may also note that several of the 
export cash crops discussed in this paper require 
signifi cant processing investment, which may 
make producers more susceptible to agribusi-
ness market power than is the case in, for 
example, most staple food crop systems in 
Africa. A policy of market liberalisation cannot 
simply wish such realities away. On the other 
hand, if NRA estimates are used as indicators 
for policy economy analysis into the drivers of 
agricultural policy, then it is important to distin-
guish taxation as a direct result of state policy 
from price distortions due to private monopoly. 
However, from a political economy perspective, 
it may be equally important to distinguish taxa-
tion as a result of exchange rate overvaluation 
from taxation that is specific to a particular 
sector, so again the argument for singling out 
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private monopoly as a problem for NRA esti-
mates can be overdone.
Overall, comparing across approaches 1 and 
2, we note that approach 1 may underestimate 
distortions pre-liberalisation, due to the difficul-
ties of capturing the impacts of administrative 
pricing through a transmission factor. By 
contrast, approach 2 may overestimate post-
liberalisation distortions that are attributable 
directly to state policy by also incorporating 
impacts of private market imperfections. In 
other words, both could be argued to underes-
timate the impact of liberalisation reforms on 
price incentives to farmers.
Approach 3: Primary products
Approaches 1 and 2 both grapple with the chal-
lenges posed by agricultural goods that are 
bought from farmers as an unprocessed 
(primary) product but traded as processed prod-
ucts. By contrast, a number of goods are classed 
by DAI authors as being traded essentially as 
primary products. In such cases, the NRA at farm-
gate can be calculated as follows: 
NRAf = (1+ sf) * (1 + θf * (Pu/ Pi – 1)) – 1
where Pu is the “wholesale price for the primary 
good” and Pi the “undistorted international price 
– primary product”. 
As can be seen, this is essentially a simplified 
version of Approach 1, hence raising the same 
issues concerning transmission factors (albeit 
just one in this case) and local taxes. 
Above we argued that a major constraint to 
the application of Approach 1 to traditional 
export crops is the availability of suitable price 
series for Pup. The same constraint – lack of avail-
able price series for Pu – also applies to goods 
being traded as primary products. In practice, 
therefore, DAI authors often have to construct 
such series from available data on producer 
(farmgate) prices. In other words, a primary 
products version of Approach 2 is used. 
Tobacco in Zimbabwe is a case where rela-
tively few costs have to be incurred to get from 
producer price to Pu. Historically, in Zimbabwe, 
commercial farmers delivered their own tobacco 
leaf to national auctions floors, where it was 
purchased directly by exporters. Thus, a more 
or less direct comparison between the domestic 
currency prices received by producers at auction 
and the observed foreign currency prices for 
Zimbabwean tobacco (converted using the 
“equilibrium exchange rate which would prevail 
in an undistorted market”) might be expected 
to give the NRA. Yet, even in an apparently 
simple case such as this, value addition along 
the supply chain may incur additional costs. For 
example:
 • Even in the absence of “processing”, the 
product as purchased from producers may 
have a higher moisture content (i.e. weigh 
more) than that which is eventually exported;
 • Even where producers deliver directly to the 
point of sale to exporters, there will be trans-
port and port costs associated with moving 
it from there to the ship. Where products are 
instead sourced from smallholders (by 
exporters or their agents), these costs become 
much larger still;
 • Exporters may perform additional sorting and 
other value adding quality control measures 
before shipping the products that they have 
purchased. Thus, Poulton et.al. (2007, p5) 
report that quality control by international 
tobacco buyers in Malawi has involved “the 
construction of warehouse facilities at which 
tobacco leaf may be subjected to further 
grading after purchase and is then trimmed 
(removing stems and tips) so that cigarette 
manufacturers can feed it straight into their 
machines when they receive it”. 
The danger then is that the designation 
“primary” product may lull analysts into compla-
cency, causing them to overlook costs that 
should be included in Pu. The consequence of 
this is that NRAs may be over-estimated.
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5. Critique of NRA Estimates for 
Cotton
NRAs for cotton are estimated for 13 SSA coun-
tries: Benin, Burkina, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We have two 
main concerns with the NRA fi gures reported 
for cotton. The first is that the calculations 
include a mix of the approaches described 
above, with Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria and 
Uganda using approach 1, whilst the remainder 
using approach 2. As mentioned above, the 
choice of approach influences the nature of 
distortions captured in NRAs. In a comparative 
perspective, using a mix of approaches is thus 
problematic.
The second, and more important, is that in 
some cases9 either NRAs are based on unreliable 
data or key parameters are left out of the 
formulae. Some of the more striking examples 
are listed below. (Others are illustrated in detail 
in Appendix 1).
 • For some countries the f.o.b. export price 
fi gures used for estimating the Pip fl uctuate 
considerably over time when compared with 
the A-index (the f.o.b. price for Zimbabwe for 
example varies between 66 and 173% of the 
A-index). This is implausible.
 • In some countries the quoted ginning out-
turn ratios vary considerably from year to 
year, too. This is also implausible, as the 
ginning out-turn ratio is a technical param-
eter that, for a given seed cotton variety10 and 
ginning technology, varies by at most 2% 
points over time as a result of climatic and 
management factors.
 • Most critically, the estimation of Pup based on 
the producer price (i.e. approach 2) is fl awed 
for three countries (Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) as a result of the non-inclusion 
of the GoR and/or problems with the assumed 
processing margin. 
 • There are also problems with the data for Pup 
in calculations using approach 1. Indeed, in 
estimates for Nigeria and Egypt, the farm-
gate price for seed cotton divided by the GoR 
is found to be smaller than the supposed Pup. 
This implies either that the data is fl awed or 
that processors were being subsidized so as 
to deliver cheap lint to domestic spinning 
industries. Either way, it results in an over-
estimate – at times a major one! - of taxation 
at farm-gate level.
Finally, we also note that cotton lint is only 
one product (albeit by far the most important 
in terms of value) that is derived from the 
ginning process. The other is cottonseed, which 
is commonly sold to local oil companies for 
crushing to produce cooking oil (with cake for 
livestock feed a further by-product of the milling 
process). In practice, the level of development 
of the domestic cottonseed market varies from 
country to country (Tschirley et.al. 2009), with 
Zimbabwe being the only African country for 
which a cottonseed price series is available on 
FAOSTAT. Furthermore, biofuel-related increases 
in the international prices of edible oils post-
date the most recent period (2000-04) for which 
NRAs have so far been calculated. Nevertheless, 
it should still be noted that, by ignoring the 
revenues from cottonseed sales, all the cotton 
NRAs tend to underestimate taxation to some 
degree.
6. Alternative NRA Estimates
With the above fi ndings in mind, we calculated 
alternative NRA estimates for cotton for fi ve ESA 
countries for which we had the necessary exper-
tise and data11. We use approach 2 for all fi ve 
countries. For Uganda, this requires that we 
update the producer price series (identifi ed as 
fl awed by the authors and thus disregarded in 
the calculations using approach 1). In 
addition:
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 • We re-estimate Pup for all countries using the 
GoR and post-farm gate margins (m) esti-
mated using data from Tschirley et.al. (2009). 
In the case of Tanzania, the farm-gate price 
is also corrected (see Appendix 1). These esti-
mates are based on data collected for 
Tschirley et al. (2009). 
 • We also re-estimate Pip using the A-index 
price (c.i.f. North Europe)12, an estimated c.i.f. 
to f.o.b. margin of 6 percent of the c.i.f. price 
and country-specific quality premia reported 
in Tschirley et al. (2009). The rationale for 
having a constant c.i.f. to f.o.b. margin in 
percentage terms is that the decline in the 
A-index has been of a similar magnitude to 
that of international shipping costs over 
recent decades.
 • For Zimbabwe, we incorporate the value of 
cottonseed as well as lint into Pip.
To illustrate our approach and provide an idea 
of the magnitude of the changes brought about 
by the different corrections operated, Appendix 
1 provides a detailed step-by-step illustration 
of our re-estimation of NRA figures for Tanzania13.
Table 1 displays both the original NRA figures 
reported in Anderson and Masters (2009) and 
our alternative estimates. For Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe the estimated rates of taxation 
Tanzania   1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Original NRA -0.83 -0.87 -0.84 -0.85 -0.73 -0.70
Our estimation -0.56 -0.59 -0.50 -0.51 -0.22 -0.13
Zimbabwe 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Original NRA -0.35 -0.45 -0.42 -0.38 -0.46 -0.36 -0.63
Our estimation -0.28 -0.39 -0.22 -0.18 -0.25 -0.02 -0.27
Zambia   1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Original NRA -0.40 -0.38 -0.77 -0.35 -0.27 -0.51
Our estimation -0.16 -0.09 -0.70 -0.20 -0.01 -0.21
Mozambique   1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Original NRA -0.64 -0.64 -0.65 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
Our estimation -0.84 -0.69 -0.82 -0.53 -0.24 -0.36
Uganda 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Original NRA -0.42 -0.80 -0.52 -0.59 -0.07 0.00 0.00
Our estimation -0.40 -0.69 -0.39 -0.37 -0.08 0.13 0.06
Sources: Authors’ calculations and spreadsheets available on the DAI project website (http://
go.worldbank.org/5XY7A7LH40)
Table 1. Original and Revised NRA figures:
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are signifi cantly reduced, with incorporation of 
the ginning outturn ratio and what we think are 
plausible margins accounting for the bulk of this 
reduction14. The reductions aff ect both pre- and 
post-liberalisation periods, but are most 
dramatic post-liberalisation, as (with the excep-
tion of Zimbabwe in 2000-04) exchange rate 
distortions are removed.
The new estimates are consistent with what 
is known about the sectors in question (Tschirley 
et.al. 2009). Exchange rate distortions prior to 
structural adjustment were more severe in 
Tanzania and Zambia than in Zimbabwe, 
peaking in the mid-1980s in Tanzania and the 
late 1980s in Zambia. However, some eff ort was 
made to relaunch a fl agging cotton sector in 
Tanzania in 1985, which may help explain why 
the average NRA for 1985-89 is lower than for 
the previous periods. Post-liberalisation (1994-
95) the cotton market in Tanzania has been 
amongst the most competitive in Africa, so, even 
though approach 2 is used, the NRA figures 
incorporate little, if any, monopoly profit. 
However, commentators on the sector noted a 
proliferation of taxes and levies imposed on 
primary marketing activities in the fi rst decade 
or so after liberalisation. These were reduced 
after 2004, so the NRA fi gure today would be 
lower than that reported for 200-04 in Table 1.
Whilst Zimbabwe has suff ered from a degree 
of exchange rate overvaluation for most of the 
period under study, taxation of agriculture was 
moderated by the infl uence of the commercial 
farm lobby over administered pricing decisions 
(Rukuni 1994, Jenkins 1997). Eff orts to encourage 
smallholder households to enter cotton produc-
tion were stepped up after 1980. However, in 
the latter 1980s, the cotton sector came under 
increasing pressure to supply lint to the domestic 
textile industry at heavily subsidised prices. 
Initially this translated in part into losses for the 
Cotton Marketing Board, but, as the Board was 
“commercialised” in preparation for privatisation 
in the early 1990s, lower lint prices had to be 
more fully passed onto producers of seed 
cotton. Following sector liberalisation in 1994-
95, the two dominant companies, Cottco and 
Cargill, made major efforts to expand small-
holder production, including through the 
payment of very attractive seed cotton prices. 
However, in the early 2000s they chose not to 
pass the full benefi t of available exchange rate 
devaluation (see footnote 2) onto producers – a 
decision that contributed to rapid new entry 
into the sector. The NRA estimates for 2000-04 
thus capture both exchange rate overvaluation 
and the impact of private oligopsony on pricing.
In Zambia, the impact of extreme exchange 
rate overvaluation in the late 1980s can be seen 
in the NRA estimates. Otherwise, cotton has not 
been seriously taxed in the country, where the 
main focus of agricultural policy is maize. As in 
Zimbabwe a post-liberalisation duopoly made 
major eff orts to expand smallholder production 
in the latter 1990s, but then chose not to pass 
the full benefi t of the country’s dramatically 
improving quality reputation onto producers 
in the early 2000s. Thus, the NRA estimates for 
2000-04 primarily refl ect the impact of private 
oligopsony on pricing.
In contrast to the three countries just 
discussed, the revised NRA estimates in 
Mozambique indicate greater taxation of the 
cotton sector than the originals had done. 
Changing to approach 2 enables us to fully 
capture the impact of administrative pricing on 
producers in the 1975-79 to 1985-89 period. In 
Mozambique privatisation of the sector occurred 
in 1989, when three joint venture companies 
were given the right to re-establish cotton 
production in defi ned zones. As the country’s 
civil war was still raging at this point, it is possible 
that the margins used in our calculations under-
estimate the true costs of doing business at this 
point (e.g. hiring of private militias to protect 
ginneries and vehicles) and hence over-estimate 
taxation of the sector. However, in the two most 
recent periods, increased NRA estimates refl ect 
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the very low seed cotton prices paid to producers 
within the concession system. As already noted, 
this reflects regulatory failing as well as lack of 
competition in the privatised market, as the 
state participates in the annual price setting 
negotiations. The original NRA estimates for the 
post-privatisation period reflect the tax levied 
on lint exports from the country to fund the 
national cotton research institute, which is the 
only explicit taxation of the sector.
In Uganda, despite the fact that we use 
approach 2 instead of approach 1 and use alter-
native data sources for a number of parameters; 
the NRAs are not significantly modified. The 
estimated rate of taxation is slightly reduced in 
the pre-liberalisation period, but not to the 
extent where it would change the interpretation 
of trends. The absence of price distortion since 
the reform is also confirmed. This suggests that 
the figures are very reliable (non-sensitive to 
methodological and data choices).
Across the five countries, our estimates 
suggest generally modest levels of taxation in 
the post-liberalisation period. Observed “taxa-
tion” comes from
 • Local-level taxation plus sector levies in 
Tanzania (subsequently reduced)
 • Exchange rate distortions in Zimbabwe post-
2001 (not a cotton, or even an export crop, 
phenomenon)
 • Oligopsony pricing of seed cotton in 
Mozambique, plus both Zimbabwe and 
Zambia in 2000-04 (picked up due to use of 
approach 2 methodology). 
This is a very different picture from that 
painted by the initial estimates. It is also rather 
closer to the WCA estimates presented by Baffes 
(2007). Across eight WCA countries, Baffes calcu-
lates an average NRA for cotton in 2000-05 of 
-0.04, ranging from -0.13 in Togo to +0.03 in Mali 
and Cameroon. The next question to ask, then, 
is whether the methodological issues affecting 
ESA cotton NRAs also affect other export crops 
and, hence, whether our finding that existing 
NRA figures tend to over-estimate taxation holds 
more generally? We briefly look into this ques-
tion in what follows.
7. The bigger picture: NRAs for 
other export crops in Africa
Anderson and Masters’ (2009, p21) claim that 
agricultural NRAs in Africa are now “most nega-
tive for tropical cash crops such as coffee, cotton, 
cocoa, and tobacco” is supported by a figure 
(Figure 1.2, p25-26) showing average NRAs by 
crop for their sample of African countries. Table 
2 summarises which crops are most heavily 
taxed according to this figure.
Unweighted 
Average NRA










9 Coffee Sheep meat
10 Vanilla Tea
Sources: Anderson and Masters (2009, p25-26)
Table 2. Most Heavily Taxed Crops 
in Africa, 2000-04
Table 3 uses FAOSTAT data to list all countries 
which produced over 5% of Africa total produc-
tion of the six most heavily taxed cash crops 
(weighted average NRAs) according to Anderson 
and Masters (2009).  For each of those countries, 
the table shows whether an NRA was estimated 
and, if so, how. 
An immediate observation is that, in a 
number of cases, NRAs are not calculated even 
when the country is included in the DAI study. 
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Zimbabwe 33 Yes -0.66 Primary
Malawi 20 No n.a. n.a.
South Africa 7 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Uganda 6 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Tanzania 6 Yes -0.55 Approach 2
Mozambique 6 Yes 0 Primary
Soybean -0.58
Nigeria 44 Yes Not calculated n.a.
South Africa 18 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Uganda 14 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Zimbabwe 11 Yes -0.68 Primary
Cotton -0.5
Egypt 15 Yes -0.34 Approach 1
Mali 11 Yes 0.01 Approach 2
Nigeria 9 Yes -0.82 Approach 1
Benin 9 Yes -0.07 Approach 2
Burkina Faso 9 Yes -0.02 Approach 2
Côte d’Ivoire 7 Yes -0.14 Approach 2




Nigeria 34 Yes -0.58 (primary) Primary
Sudan 11 Yes -0.29 (primary) Primary
Senegal 7 Yes -0.21 Primary
Chad 5 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Table 3. Farm-level NRAs for key African cash crops at a glance
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This means that the average levels of taxation 
displayed in Anderson and Masters (2009) Figure 
1.2b sometimes reflects the estimated level of 
taxation in a single country (e.g. Zimbabwe for 
soybean or Sudan for sesame) or perhaps only 
two-three. This makes the “average” figures 
highly susceptible to idiosyncratic features or 
even errors in a single country. We would thus 
argue that the “average” figure for both tobacco 
and soybean owes much more to the macro-
economic crisis in Zimbabwe during 2001-04 
than to any generalized “tropical cash crop” 
effect.
We also observe that some of the issues iden-
tified in relation to cotton also apply for other 
crops. As noted in footnote 8 above, the high 
level of taxation for Tanzanian tobacco reflects 
in part the impact of private monopsony on 
pricing. Three agribusiness firms set out 
competing for the business of smallholder 
tobacco producers by providing an input 
package on credit, then discovered that they 
could not control side-selling at harvest time, 
so amalgamated their contract farming opera-
tions into a single, jointly-owned venture that 
divided the resulting leaf amongst the share-
holders on a quota basis.
The NRAs for Tanzanian tea, which features 
in Table 2 though not Table 3, do not include 
the processing conversion factor, estimated to 
range between 0.17 and 0.36 over the study 
period. This suggests that the level of taxation 
(NRA = -0.91 for 2000-04) is over-estimated by 
at least as much as the figure for Tanzanian 
cotton. 
A notable feature of Table 3 is that most of 
the products are treated as being traded as 
primary products. We suspect that one reason 
for some of the substantial negative NRAs is that 
real marketing costs have been overlooked in 
the calculations of Pu. Thus, for example, cocoa 
beans are sourced from smallholders in both 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, then transported and 
stored until the time for export. However, whilst 










Sudan 22 Yes -0.38 Primary
Uganda 8 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Nigeria 6 Yes Not calculated n.a.
Cocoa -0.38
Côte d’Ivoire 56 Yes -0.48 Primary
Ghana 20 Yes -0.21 Primary
Nigeria 16 Yes -0.17 Primary
Cameroon 6 Yes 0.01 Approach 1
Sources: FAOstat for production shares, DAI Project ‘national spreadsheets’ for NRAs (crop averages are 
guesstimates of those displayed in Anderson and Masters 2009, figure 1.2b)
Note: We have listed countries which produce over 5% of Africa total on average between 2000 and 
2004.
Table 3. (Continuation)
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in Ghana a plausible average margin of 49% is 
added to the farmgate price in 2000-04 to cover 
these marketing costs15, in Côte d’Ivoire the 
margin added is only 9%. There may even be a 
few cases of overlooked out-turn ratios, for 
example in groundnuts where purchases from 
farmers may be unshelled nuts but subsequent 
trade may be in shelled nuts (out-turn ratio = 
0.7).
Cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana do, however, 
represent a case where one might expect a fair 
degree of taxation and a genuine “tropical cash 
crop” eff ect. This is because the two countries 
combine to dominate the world supply of cocoa. 
Hence, restricting supply through taxation can 
help keep the “world” price of cocoa up. 
According to Faki and Taha (2007), the same 
logic held for sesame exports from Sudan, at 
least until 2000. Thus, whilst in general we are 
not convinced that “tropical cash crops” are more 
heavily taxed than other crops in Africa, we do 
recognize these potential exceptions.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have critically examined the 
NRA estimates for cotton in a number of African 
countries. This exploration is made possible by 
the decision of the DAI project to make its back-
ground data freely available on its website, for 
which the project should be commended. It 
reaffirms the basic finding of Anderson and 
Masters (2009) that the extent of agricultural 
taxation in Africa has fallen signifi cantly since 
structural adjustment, but suggest that the 
levels of taxation reported in Anderson and 
Masters (2009) are unduly high both pre-reform 
in some countries and post-reform in most of 
them. A preliminary look at other export crops 
suggests that some of the problems that aff ect 
the NRA estimates for cotton also affect the 
estimates for these other crops. This leads us to 
question the assertion that agricultural NRAs in 
Africa are now “most negative for tropical cash 
crops such as coff ee, cotton, cocoa, and tobacco” 
(Anderson and Masters 2009, p21).
Insofar as such crops are still systematically 
“taxed”, the two main reasons would seem to 
be:
 • Moderating supply so as to sustain prices, 
where one or two countries have pricing 
power in the international market
 • The impact of private oligopsony on producer 
prices post-liberalisation.
Inclusion of this latter eff ect in NRA estimates 
is controversial, but is a consequence of one 
approach to calculating NRAs (used by some of 
the DAI project authors for fully justifiable 
reasons of data availability, although not 
preferred by the project as a whole). In this paper 
we have argued that including the impacts of 
post-liberalisation private monopoly alongside 
pre-liberalisation state monopoly is entirely 
reasonable if the objective of NRA analysis is to 
compare the impact of the “whole package” of 
state policy on farmers over time. In the case of 
cotton we noted that post-liberalisation state 
regulatory policy may accept a degree of private 
monopoly or oligopoly and, therefore, that the 
burden imposed on farmers will depend at least 
in part on the eff ectiveness of the regulator in 
counter-acting the impact of that power on 
pricing. On the other hand, if NRA estimates are 
used as indicators for policy economy analysis 
into the drivers of agricultural policy, then it is 
important to distinguish taxation as a direct 
result of state policy from price distortions due 
to private monopoly. However, from a political 
economy perspective, it may be equally impor-
tant to distinguish taxation as a result of 
exchange rate overvaluation from taxation that 
is specifi c to a particular sector.
We also note that several of the export cash 
crops discussed in this paper require signifi cant 
processing investment, which may make 
producers more susceptible to agribusiness 
market power than is the case in, for example, 
most staple food crop systems in Africa. This, as 
14Research Paper 022 | April 2011 
much as any conscious state taxation policy, may 
explain observed levels of taxation on “tropical 
cash crops”.
Looking at the causes of flawed NRA esti-
mates, we are inclined to emphasise rather 
mundane resourcing issues, rather than any 
ideological drive to generate a particular result. 
The most that the DAI project might be accused 
of is an undue willingness to accept continuing 
high estimates of agricultural taxation in Africa 
– because African states have been known to 
tax their farmers heavily in the past. In terms of 
resourcing, Anderson and Masters (2008, p15) 
recognise that: “Estimating the NRA or the CTE 
for an individual industry requires specialist 
knowledge of that sector, particularly in coun-
tries where trade costs are high, pass-through 
along the value chain is affected by imperfect 
competition, and markets for foreign currency 
have been distorted at various times and to 
varying degrees in the past. Specialist knowl-
edge is also needed to assess how policy is actu-
ally implemented.” This paper has uncovered 
cases where such “specialist knowledge” was 
clearly lacking. When secondary data sources 
and historical information on policy are limited 
– as in much of Africa – then expecting one or 
two consultants to construct NRA series for 
multiple commodities over several decades is 
perhaps too ambitious.
In our view, more of the NRA estimates would 
benefit from a thorough checking by people 
with specialist knowledge of the sectors 
concerned, in order that those who use the 
figures as the basis for subsequent political 
economy analysis can be confident that they 
are trying to explain real effects. However, the 
implication of the foregoing argument is that 
such checking will itself be a fairly substantial 
and costly exercise.
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Appendix 1. Detailed re-estimation 
of NRAs for Tanzania 
According to Tschirley et.al. (2009), during the 
decade that followed the liberalisation of the 
Tanzanian cotton sector in 1994, producers in 
Tanzania received the highest average share of 
the ex-ginnery price of lint of producers in all 
nine surveyed African countries, despite signifi-
cant village and district level taxes on cotton 
marketing (only reduced around 2004). Changes 
in world prices are passed onto producers 
through fierce competition between 30-40 
ginners, notwithstanding the fact that competi-
tive pressure can vary across seasons, with 
competition for seed cotton in drought seasons 
sometimes leading to losses amongst ginneries 
that have contracts to fulfil, whilst competition 
is less intense in years of bumper harvest.
The competitive nature of the sector post-
liberalisation means that calculating NRAs by 
starting with the farmgate price of seed cotton 
and adding an “efficient” margin for seed cotton 
purchase, ginning and for transportation of the 
resulting lint to the port is an appropriate 
approach in the Tanzanian case. Nevertheless, 
this approach is not without its challenges. 
Specifically:
 • Seed cotton prices vary considerably within 
a given buying season. Whether or not 
Tanzania Cotton Board issues an indicative 
price at the start of the buying season (policy 
on this has varied over time), it is common 
for the close of season seed cotton price to 
be double the indicative price. Occasionally, 
in a year of bumper harvest (and especially 
if the Tanzanian buying season coincides with 
a fall in the world market price), buying prices 
can peak part-way through the season, then 
fall once buyers have fulfilled their major 
orders. This happened in 2004, for example. 
These variations mean that analysts have to 
“guesstimate” an average producer price for 
each season, as data on how much seed 
cotton is bought at different buying prices is 
not readily available16. 
 • The sector is subject to major climate-induced 
fluctuations in production (much more so 
than WCA, for example). As well as its effect 
on the strength of competition noted above, 
this means that: 1) capacity utilisation at 
ginneries can vary considerably from season 
to season; 2) the “efficient” ginnery margin, 
therefore, varies from season to season.
The NRA calculations for Tanzanian cotton 
have already been identified as problematic, but 
unfortunately not for the reasons given above. 
As is explained in Morrissey and Leyaro (2007, 
p31 and Appendix Table 9), the original NRA 
calculations that appear in Anderson and 
Masters (eds, 2009) and which still feature in the 
online Excel database, did not incorporate the 
ginning out-turn ratio when comparing farm-
gate price of seed cotton with export price of 
lint, thus dramatically overstating the degree of 
taxation on cotton throughout the study period 
(1976-2004). Whilst Morrissey and Leyaro (2007, 
p31 and Appendix Table 9) report efforts to 
correct for this, these are also unsatisfactory, as 
will be shown below. This note, therefore, elabo-
rates the process of deriving our preferred esti-
mates for NRAs in Tanzanian cotton.
Table T1 presents the results of a number of 
adjustments to the original NRA calculations for 
Tanzanian cotton, which, all combined, led to 
our preferred estimate reported in Table 1. The 
figures in row 1 are those presented in Anderson 
and Masters (2009) and which still feature in the 
online Excel database. The change in row 2 is 
the most important: (correctly) incorporating 
the ginning out-turn ratio dramatically lowers 
the estimated rate of taxation on Tanzanian 
cotton throughout the study period. Note that 
this is what “revision 1” in Morrissey and Leyaro 
(2007, Appendix Table 9) should have done. 
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In rows 3 and 4 we introduce information 
from the study by Tschirley et.al. (2009) that is 
not available in the online spreadsheet. These 
modifi cations have less of an impact and the 
impacts in part counterbalance each other. In 
row 3 we do two things. Firstly, we re-estimate 
the f.o.b. export price, against which the 
producer price (adjusted for ginning out-turn, 
plus processing and marketing margins) should 
be compared. The new reference price is the A 
index price (c.i.f. North Europe, average for the 
year beginning August 1st), adjusted for esti-
mated premium or discount received by 
Tanzanian lint and a c.i.f. to f.o.b. margin of 6 
percent. We know little about the export price 
fi gures used by Morrissey and Leyaro, but we 
note that their f.o.b. prices vary signifi cantly with 
respect to the A-index - ranging from 63% to 
103% of the latter - which we fi nd implausible. 
Secondly, we observe that the seed cotton prices 
used by Morrissey and Leyaro are all out by one 
year, e.g. the price that they give for 2004 is actu-
ally the price paid to farmers in 200317. We thus 
correct for this. The combined eff ect of these 
changes is to reduce the estimated NRA for all 
periods except 1976-79. 
Finally, in row 4 we adjust the marketing and 
processing margins used by Morrissey and 
Leyaro in the light of data collected by Tschirley 
et.al. (2009). The original NRA calculations 
include two margins when building up from 
seed cotton price to f.o.b. export equivalent 
price:
 • A 20% margin on the seed cotton price to 
cover seed cotton purchase costs and trans-
portation to the ginnery;
 • A 35% margin from the ginnery gate to the 
port, which includes both ginning costs and 
post-ginnery transportation.
As noted above, the big challenge with such 
estimates is the impact of climate fl uctuations 
and hence variations in capacity utilisation. In 
addition, as these margins are cost-based, ceteris 
paribus they tend to fall in percentage terms 
when seed cotton prices rise (for example, in 
response to higher international prices).
Table T2 uses ginnery budget data from 2006, 
collected by Tschirley et.al. (2009), to illustrate 
the impacts of diff erent seed cotton prices and 
levels of capacity utilisation on the two margins. 
Seed cotton prices are expressed as a percentage 
of f.o.b. lint equivalent for 2006, whilst capacity 
utilisation is expressed in terms of days of 
ginnery operation during the season. We note 
that:
 • Seed cotton prices have been higher as a 
percentage of f.o.b. lint equivalent post-
liberalisation than they were pre-liberalisa-
tion, thanks to competition between buyers. 
On average during the 1995-2005 period, 
Tanzanian cotton farmers received around 
60% of the f.o.b. lint equivalent price;
1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
1. Original -83.1 -87.4 -84.2 -85.4 -72.8 -70.2
2. Ginning Out-turn -48.4 -61.8 -49.4 -58.6 -19.6 -10.8
3. A Index reference price + 
adjusted seed cotton price -50.4 -54.7 -44.1 -45.3 -13.1 -3.3
4. Adjusted margins -55.6 -59.5 -50.0 -51.1 -22.3 -13.4
Table A1: Revising the NRA Calculations for Tanzanian Cotton
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 • Post-liberalisation, there is a negative correla-
tion between the share of the f.o.b. lint equiv-
alent price received by producers and average 
capacity utilisation at ginneries, as climate-
induced fluctuations in available seed cotton 
harvest drive both.
Our assessment of Table T2 suggests that an 
“efficient” primary marketing margin of 16% 
might be more appropriate than 20%. Choosing 
an appropriate “efficient” ginning and post-
ginnery margin is more difficult. Thus, in 2000-04 
ginning capacity utilisation perhaps only aver-
aged 60 days per season in four of the years, but 
was closer to 150 days in the bumper harvest 
year of 2004. In earlier periods average capacity 
utilisation was perhaps somewhat higher, albeit 
still with major fluctuations year-on-year. In row 
4 of Table T1 we, therefore, assume a processing 
margin of 0.25, instead of the 0.35 assumed by 
Morrissey and Leyaro.
If we take row 4 of Table T1 as our preferred 
NRA calculations for Tanzanian cotton, we note 
that there was still a noteworthy degree of taxa-
tion of the sector in the first decade after liber-
alisation – although much less than in the 
original estimates by Morrissey and Leyaro. Most 
of this was local-level taxation, levied on cotton 
marketing activity by village and district authori-
ties. According to a 1999 report by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, total taxes and 
levies on marketed seed cotton amounted to 
TShs 24 per kg when the seed cotton price was 
TShs 185 per kg (i.e. 13%). Over the next five 
years central government moved to control the 
level of local taxation on cotton marketing, but 
the effect on observed taxation of seed cotton 
prices is obscured by the introduction of levies 
for input purchase. Between 2000 and 2002 
these amounted to a new tax on producers, as 
few producers benefited from the inputs that 
were procured as a result. However, from 2003 
these did function more or less as an individual 
input entitlement (i.e. a forced saving mecha-
nism for producers), so observed seed cotton 
prices should really be adjusted upwards accord-
ingly (but have not been).
This discussion suggests that the NRA esti-
mates in row 4 of Table T1 are reasonable, at 
least for the post-liberalisation periods. However, 
it is also clear that there is some margin of error 
in any NRA estimates calculated for Tanzanian 
cotton, given available data and the volatility 
of production conditions in the sector.
Appendix 2: Alternative estimates 
– Specific data and calculation 
modifications
Mozambique
 • We calculate Pup with approach 2 using the 
producer price data in the spreadsheet and: 
Seed Cotton Price as % of f.o.b. Lint Equivalent
40% 50% 60% 70%
Primary Marketing Margin 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.14
Ginnery + Post-Ginnery 
Margin at Capacity 
Utilisation of:
30 days 0.49 0.4 0.35 0.3
60 days 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.24
90 days 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.22
150 days 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.2
Table A2: “Efficient” Marketing Margins under Varying Assumptions
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 - A constant GoR of 0.37 (instead of the 
values in the spreadsheet which vary 
between 0.23 and 1.2)
 -  A margin (m) of 62% (which was derived 
from an estimated farm-gate to ginnery 
cost of 20% and a ginnery to f.o.b. cost of 
35%).
 • We re-calculate the f.o.b. price by discounting 
the A index by 4cts/kg 
Tanzania
 • We re-calculate the Pup using: 
 - A margin of 0.45 (which was derived from 
an estimated farm-gate to ginnery cost of 
18% and a ginnery to FOB cost of 25%).
 - A GoR of 0.35 (instead of the spreadsheet 
data which varies between 0.27 and 0.71)
 - the producer price fi gure reported for year 
t as the price for year t-1.
Uganda
 • We calculate the Pup with approach 2 using 
 - The producer price data in the spread-
sheet until 1991 and then data from the 
U g a n d a  C o t t o n  D e v e l o p m e n t 
Organisation (http://cdouga.org) as from 
1995. Because CDO data is not available 
before 1995, between 1991 and 1995, we 
use data from the FAO. The FAO data is in 
line with both the spreadsheet data 
pre-1991 and the CDO data post-1995,
 - A GoR of 0.35 instead of 0.33
 - A margin of 75%. The large size of this 
margin is attributable to a low utilisation 
rate of ginneries and to high transporta-
tion costs from ginneries to port.
 • We re-calculate the f.o.b. price by adding a 
quality premium to the A-index, which 
declines linearly from 4cts/kg at the begin-
ning of the study period to 2 cts/kg by 2005.
Zambia 
 • We recalculate the Pup using
 - A margin of 0.66. 
 - A GoR of 0.36 instead of 0.4.
 • We re-calculate the f.o.b. price by include a 
quality premium which rises linearly from 
zero until the reform (1994) to 9cts/kg in 2004. 
Zimbabwe
 • We recalculate the Pup we using
 - A margin which refl ects the proportion of 
commercial and smallholder farmers. 
Because commercial farmers did not 
receive extension services and delivered 
their cotton to ginneries, we estimate the 
margin to 0.44. When the cotton has to be 
collected from smallholders and extension 
services are provided we estimate the 
margin to 0.66 as in Zambia. The margin 
is thus a weighted average of the above 
two, based on a proportion of commercial 
farmers of 100% until 1970, which linearly 
decreases to 80% in 1980, 50% in 1990 
and 0% in 2000.
 - A GoR of 0.36 instead of 0.4.
 • We re-calculate the FOB price by applying a 
quality premium of 11cts/kg until 2003 and 
6.4cts/kg in 2004 and adding the cotton seed 
price (FAOstat in local currency)
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End Notes
1 There are a few commodities for which 
domestic policies in major producing and 
consuming countries have been so distorting 
that this cannot be said to be true. Rather, the 
world market has been reduced to little more 
than a residual market where domestic 
surpluses (supported by subsidy policy) are 
dumped. As a result, it becomes the norm for 
any country producing the good in question to 
resort to subsidy, as the world market price is 
below the true cost of production in almost all 
countries. Sugar has been the classic example 
of this (Tyler 2008). Anderson and Masters 
(2009, p21) note that, “As in other regions of 
the world, the rice pudding ingredients of 
sugar, rice, and milk are among the products 
receiving the highest assistance” in Africa. 
However, this may in part be because the 
assumption that the world price represents an 
“undistorted” price does not hold for these 
commodities.
2 The case of Zimbabwe post-2001 may be 
instructive here. When the fast track land 
redistribution programme began in 2001, 
there was a sudden and dramatic shortage of 
foreign exchange in the country due to 1) the 
collapse of tobacco exports (previously around 
60% of all merchandise exports); 2) a 
withdrawal of foreign direct investment, and 
3) reduced aid flows. The government 
attempted to maintain an official exchange 
rate that was woefully out of line with new 
demand and supply realities for foreign 
exchange, but was soon forced to allow 
exporters to retain a significant proportion of 
their foreign currency earnings, which could 
then be traded on the parallel market. The 
actual exchange rate obtained by exporters 
was thus a blend (weighted average) of official 
and parallel market rates. As inflation did not 
kick in for a couple of years after the foreign 
exchange shock, for a while this represented a 
real depreciation in the exchange rate, 
compared with 2001 and before. However, 
compared to the rate required to balance 
demand and supply for foreign exchange in 
post-2001 conditions, even this blend rate was 
too high. Had exporters been able to exchange 
foreign currency at a lower “equilibrium 
exchange rate”, they could have paid domestic 
producers more for their produce in local 
currency terms out of the same hard currency 
receipts than they were actually able to do.
3 As will be argued below, the analyst should 
check that the local price is not 
administratively set below that available to 
exporters of the same product.
4 As documented by Poulton (1998) for cashew 
in Tanzania and widely reported for cotton in 
the same country, evasion of local-level taxes 
may also be high. Using stated rates may thus 
over-state the burden of taxation on the 
supply chain.
5 A good example is Ethiopian coffee, where 
the transmission coefficient from NRAprimary to 
NRAf varies from year to year (average over the 
period 1981-2004 = 0.75) and is calculated to 
multiple decimal places.
6 A good example here is cotton in 
Mozambique, where, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, administratively set producer 
prices were held constant for 3-4 years at a 
time, only being (partially) adjusted with a lag 
to changing world price and macroeconomic 
trends.
7 This assumes that inflated margins have not 
been covered by subsidy from the central state 
to the parastatal marketing organization 
involved.
8 In the Tanzania country study, for example, it 
is noted that “it is quite possible that for cash 
crops such as tea, cotton, beans, and tobacco, 
the negative estimates reflect market 
inefficiencies in addition to (and perhaps even 
more than) policy distortions” (Morrissey and 
Leyaro 2007, p324).
9 The NRA estimates for French-speaking WCA 
countries reported in Baffes (2007) are 
carefully constructed, so the comments in this 
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section are directed at the other seven 
countries.
10 In most countries only 1-3 seed cotton 
varieties are planted at any given time, usually 
zoned by region. When new varieties are 
introduced they commonly embody an 
incremental increase in ginning out-turn ratio 
over the varieties that they replace, but 
research systems in many countries have not 
performed well, such that a decade or more 
can sometimes pass between varietal releases.
11 It would have been desirable to recalculate 
the NRAs for Nigeria and Egypt as well, given 
that we have grounds for believing that both 
are over-estimated. However, we do not have 
the knowledge of these sectors that is 
necessary for this task.
12 A index data was obtained from the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(ICAC).
13 Tanzanian cotton was our entry point for this 
paper, as it was where we fi rst spotted the 
problems with existing NRA estimates.
14 In the original Tanzania estimates, the GOR 
was simply not taken into account. In the 
original Zambia and Zimbabwe estimates, the 
GOR is also not taken into account, but the 
margin (common to both countries) that is 
added to the farm-gate price is too large to 
capture ginning and marketing costs – albeit 
insuffi  cient to cover the ginning 
transformation.
15 In Ghana the margin averages 67% over the 
longer period 1976-2004.
16 On the other hand, there are equal 
diffi  culties in obtaining reliable ex-ginnery or 
f.o.b. export prices for Tanzanian lint, given the 
large number of ginners and exporters, and 
the pervasive quality problems in the sector 
that result in regular but idiosyncratic price 
discounts for lint consignments. This 
eff ectively rules our use of approach 1 for 
calculating NRAs.
17 One of the fi rst statistical features of the 
Tanzanian cotton sector that analysts have to 
come to terms with is the practice of the 
Tanzanian Cotton Board of organizing all data 
according to so-called “lint marketing years”, 
which begin on August 1st. Thus, seed cotton 
which was grown during the production 
season November 2002 – June 2003 and sold 
to ginners during June – August 2003 – which 
all agricultural economists would record as 
2002-03 production season (or 2003 harvest) is 
recorded by TCB as the production associated 
with lint marketing year 2003-04. This is so 
even though, in a year of low harvest, ginning 
operations can be completed before the end 
of the calendar year! The same “quirk” aff ects 
recorded seed cotton prices.
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